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Abstract
Background: Reporting of influenza-like illness (ILI) from general practice/family doctor (GPFD) clinics is an accurate
indicator of real-time epidemic activity and requires little effort to set up, making it suitable for developing countries
currently experiencing the influenza A (H1N1 -2009) pandemic or preparing for subsequent epidemic waves.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We established a network of GPFDs in Singapore. Participating GPFDs submitted returns
via facsimile or e-mail on their work days using a simple, standard data collection format, capturing: gender; year of birth;
‘‘ethnicity’’;residential status; bodytemperature(uC);and treatment (antiviral or not); for all caseswitha clinical diagnosisof an
acute respiratory illness (ARI). The operational definition of ILI in this study was an ARI with fever of 37.8uC or more. The data
were processed daily by the study co-ordinator and fed into a stochastic model of disease dynamics, which was refitted daily
using particle filtering, with data and forecasts uploaded to a website which could be publicly accessed. Twenty-three GPFD
clinics agreed to participate. Data collection started on 2009-06-26 and lasted for the duration of the epidemic. The epidemic
appeared to have peaked around 2009-08-03 and the ILI rates had returned to baseline levels by the time of writing.
Conclusions/Significance: This real-time surveillance system is able to show the progress of an epidemic and indicates
when the peak is reached. The resulting information can be used to form forecasts, including how soon the epidemic wave
will end and when a second wave will appear if at all.
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Introduction
On 2009-04-24, the World Health Organization (WHO)
reported the spread of a novel influenza A (H1N1) strain in the
United States and Mexico. Sentinel surveillance which was mainly
hospital based had indicated increased numbers of influenza-like-
illness (ILI) in Mexico occurring since 2009-03-18 [1]. Over the
next months, the virus spread rapidly across the globe, resulting in
the WHO declaring a pandemic and advising countries to activate
their pandemic preparedness plans [2]. Singapore identified her
first imported case of influenza A (H1N1-2009) on 2009-05-27 [3],
and the first unlinked cases on 2009-06-19 [4], which indicated
community transmission had begun in Singapore.
Singapore experienced all three influenza pandemics of the last
century—in1918,1957and1968[5,6].Duringthe1957pandemic,
reportingofinfluenzacasesbycliniciansprovidedareasonablyclear
indication of daily epidemic activity (Figure 1A) [7]. Influenza-like
illness (ILI) has also been used widely as an indicator of influenza
activity during non-pandemic epidemics, with ILI reporting by
sentinel general practice/family doctor (GPFD) clinics forming the
backbone of surveillance systems for influenza in many countries
[8–14], and these have been used to monitor the current pandemic
[15–18]. In Singapore, though, acute respiratory illness (ARI) data
captured from electronic medical records, as a more general
indicator of infectious disease outbreaks, have traditionally been
used by health authorities, including during the early part of the
current pandemic. However, ILI monitoring can provide an
estimate of case numbers and hence attack rates, hospitalisation
and case fatality ratios [19], and is more specific for influenza than
ARIs.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 April 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 4 | e10036Data from ILI monitoring can also be used for modelling of
influenza epidemics and pandemics [20–23]. Modelling can be
performed retrospectively to determine the relative importance of
community compared to household transmission, or to determine
the effect of pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical interventions
[21,23–26]. Modelling can also be performed in real-time during an
epidemic, as proposed by Hall and colleagues, who used mortality
data from England and Wales to demonstrate how models could
have forecast when epidemic activity would peak during several
historical pandemic events [27]. Since H1N1-2009 has low
hospitalisation and mortality rates (less than 1% of infected
individuals) [28], reporting of ILI from GPFD clinics would
potentially provide a more accurate indicator of real-time epidemic
activity and progress than hospitalisations and confirmed fatalities.
While data on ARIs are routinely collated and laboratory
surveillance of influenza has been in place in Singapore for more
than 30 years [29], there is currently no system for monitoring
GPFD consults for ILI in Singapore. In order to monitor the
epidemic and adjust response plans in real-time, we rapidly
developed a system for ILI surveillance, with resulting data and
forecasts made publicly available via a website. The purpose of this
paper is twofold:
N to describe how the system was developed and used to monitor
the progress of the epidemic; and
N to describe how the resulting information was used to perform
near real-time forecasting of the course of the epidemic in
Singapore.
Results
We started the project in early June 2009, shortly after
Singapore identified her first imported case of influenza A
(H1N1-2009) on 2009-05-27. We sent out mass appeals to 535
e-mail addresses of GPFDs or clinics, and 23 clinics agreed to
participate; the locations of the participating GPFD clinics are
shown in Figure 2. Four clinics were city or office area practices
and the remainder were situated in residential areas across the
island.
Figure 1(B,C) shows trends in consultations for ARIs and ILIs
from the network. Data submissions started on 2009-06-25, by
which time there had been 315 confirmed H1N1 cases (including
87 locally transmitted cases) in Singapore [30]. There was a clear
but initially unanticipated weekly periodicity to the data, with
 
  
 
         
 
  
 
   
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
    
  
 
  
 
     
 
   
  
Figure 1. Influenza diagnoses in Singapore in 1957 and 2009 using alternative methods. (A) ILI in government and city council clinics,
1957 [7]. (B) ARI in this GPFD sentinel network, 2009. (C) ILI in this GPFD network, 2009. (D) Weekly ARI in government polyclinics, 2009 [31]. (A–C)
Both daily counts (lines) and weekly averages (shaded polygons) are presented. (D) A marked drop in baseline ARI consultations can be seen
immediately before the epidemic, complicating the determination of when the epidemic started using this measure.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010036.g001
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in attendances. For descriptive purposes (but not analytical ones),
we therefore used weekly averages to provide a smoothed picture
of the epidemic trajectory. A comparison between Figure 1B or D
and C clearly displays ILI as a better indicator of epidemic activity
than ARI. The weekly average ARI consults per doctor in the
early epidemic period was between 10 and 15 (Figure 1B), and
peaked at 17 in the week ending 2009-07-25, but from this alone it
was difficult to determine how much H1N1-2009 epidemic activity
there was around the time community transmission was starting;
this is compounded by the high baseline rate making the height of
the peak relatively low, at just around one and a half times the
baseline level. Figure 1D shows the weekly epidemiological data
for acute respiratory tract infections in Singapore based on
government clinic attendances for ARI [31]. The government
clinic ARI data peaked in the week ending 2009-08-01, but, as
with our ARI surveillance data, the high levels of background
noise make it difficult to ascertain how much community-level
infection there was near the start of the epidemic, especially since
the epidemic was preceded by a considerable dip in ARI numbers.
On the other hand, there was a marked, nearly five-fold increase
in our ILI case data, from an average of about 2=3 of an ILI per
GPFD per day in the week ending 2009-06-27 to a peak of 31=2 in
the week ending 2009-08-01. The highest recorded ILI rate
occurred on 2009-08-03 (a Monday) with 61=2 ILIs per family
doctor being reported. The sentinel network indicated that the
epidemic had peaked around the start of August, and that ILI rates
had returned to near baseline levels early in September.
Predictions of the number of ILIs being seen by our GPFDs and
of the total number of people infected are presented in figure 3;
animations of these forecasts and of the forecast total number
seeking medical attention can be found in the supporting
information (ILI/ GPFD /d in video S1, total ILI/d in video S2
and cumulative infections in video S3). These incorporate both
population stochasticity and parametric uncertainty. The eventual
forecast was that 13% of the population had been infected, with a
95% credible interval of (9%,19%). Initial forecasts were adversely
affected by uncertainty in the parameters, caused by the vagueness
of the subjective prior distributions we used and the scarcity of
information from the data. By the middle of July, the algorithm
was correctly forecasting the peak would occur at the start of
August, although the magnitude of the epidemic was grossly
overpredicted, and the accuracy of the forecast of the time of the
peak may have been merely fortuitous. By the end of July,
forecasts were stabilising around what transpired to be the
eventual data, and by the middle of August, after the peak had
come, the forecasts closely foreshadowed the tail of the epidemic.
A measure of predictive accuracy is presented in figure 4. By the
end of July, predictive error was averaging around 1 ILI per
GPFD per day over a one-week time horizon. The sequence of
subjective posterior distributions for the parameters and for the
effective reproduction number Rt over time are presented in
figure 5, although we stress that these are our subjective
distributions and do not expect the reader to share them [32–34].
Discussion
We have shown that it is possible rapidly, and at short notice, to
deploy a real-time influenza epidemic surveillance system using
GPFDs in the absence of an existing system. This is likely to be a
workable model in much of the developing world where a
significant proportion of primary care is delivered by private
practice GPFDs. Firstly, we provide proof of concept that it is
feasible, within a month, and with no budget, to establish a
protocol for daily data submission for ILI and begin submission.
Secondly, we show that processing the data in near real-time—
with cases seen each day entered by the following day—can
provide graphical trends that describe the progress of an influenza
epidemic. Finally, we demonstrate how such data can be used in
real-time, and in combination with a process-based model refitted
daily, to generate forecasts that can subsequently be verified
against actual data as an epidemic unfolds, as is common in other
dynamic applications such as weather and finance.
While ILI surveillance is used widely in temperate countries
[8–13], there are few publications on the effectiveness of ILI
surveillance in tropical countries to chart the spread of epidemic
Figure 2. Spot map showing the locations of participating GPFD clinics in Singapore. Most populated parts of the island were
represented, the exception being the Woodlands, Sembawang and Yishun areas to the North.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010036.g002
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diseases and minimal seasonal forcing. Evidence is now emerging
on the value of such surveillance systems in the tropics [35], and
our study shows that ILI surveillance can track epidemic influenza
activity in such settings. The slow uptake of influenza surveillance
systems for tropical countries may be related to the lack of
appreciation for the epidemiology and impact of tropical influenza
[36]. Previous work has shown that both non-pandemic (often
called ‘‘seasonal’’ in temperate countries in which influenza is
associated with winter) and pandemic influenza caused substantial
excess mortality in tropical Singapore [5,37].
In Singapore, influenza activity has traditionally been moni-
tored through a combination of laboratory and ARI morbidity
[29]. ARI data reflect the total burden of acute respiratory illness
from all causes, often including non-infectious causes such as
exacerbations of chronic lung disease which may be environmental
in origin. However, it is clear from this study that while both ARI
and ILI counts give an indication of when epidemic activity peaks,
ILI data provide better resolution of influenza epidemic activity,
with the relative magnitude of increase over the baseline being far
greater than for ARI data, since influenza activity in the early
epidemic phase is masked by the high and obstreperous baseline
rates of other respiratory illnesses diagnosed as ARI. The other
system for tracking influenza activity in Singapore is based on
laboratory confirmed diagnoses of influenza. This is similar to
what is done in many countries throughout the world as part of the
World Health Organization’s Global Influenza Surveillance
Network. Monitoring of laboratory confirmed diagnoses picked
up an increase in H1N1-2009 isolates among a sub-sample of ILI
cases presenting at government polyclinics about one week before
the epidemic was apparent in our ILI data (data not shown).
However, the advantages of ILI surveillance is that it is much
cheaper than laboratory-based surveillance and there are no
capacity issues that may limit the number of samples that can be
processed daily. In addition, laboratory testing of random samples
is less sensitive to changes in absolute numbers of community cases
at the peak of the pandemic when the influenza proportion among
ILI cases remains relatively steady [31]. ILI surveillance is
therefore a cheaper and possibly more effective alternative to
traditional laboratory surveillance, especially for resource-poor
areas, to obtain reasonable sample sizes.
Setting up such a surveillance network has the secondary benefit
of allowing real-time forecasting, which allows more informed
policy making. By forecasting the epidemic ahead of time, we
allow our forecasts of epidemic activity to be verified against data.
We observed during the epidemic that modelling results correctly
forecast the timing of peak epidemic activity on some days, but was
off by up to a week at other times, though the actual magnitude of
the peak was markedly different from early forecasts. We note
though that even the relative accuracy of the forecast of the timing
of the peak may have been merely fortuitous, and stress that we
provide no theoretical results to guarantee this accuracy is
repeatable. One particular difficulty we faced was ensuring the
predictive accuracy of the system, given the lack of training data
and the need to inform policy making as the epidemic unfolded.
The results presented herein are therefore almost entirely the same
as those presented on-line, including any shortcomings; the only
alterations to the model and approach were to allow reporting
rates to vary across the week (a change partially implemented part-
way through the study) and to remove an adhoc method intended
to make the approach more robust to potential changes to the
parameters in time (which transpired not to improve matters
enough to warrant introducing statistical non-coherencies).
The eventual forecast for the final size of the outbreak was
around 13% with a 95% credible interval of (9%,19%). If true,
then combined with the rolling out of vaccine and the potential for
some additional existing immunity [38] (a possibility we
conservatively excluded from the analysis), this figure suggests
Singapore is unlikely to experience a large second wave without
substantial mutation of the pathogen. The estimate of around 13%
corresponds closely to a paired serological study of Singaporean
adults which estimated 13% (11,16)%, adjusting for the age
distribution of the country, had experienced a four-fold rise in
antibody titres (Mark I-Cheng Chen, personal communication).
The close correspondence adds considerable confidence to the
conclusions of the study.
Further evaluation is underway ofthe value of retaining a sentinel
network permanently in a tropical city-state with year-round non-
pandemic influenza transmission and additional bi-annual epidem-
ics. By establishing an avenue for public display of infectious disease
forecasts, we hope to build public and institutional confidence in
andacceptanceof modelling inthe context of infectiousdiseases.To
this end, the network was publicised in the local media and the
website was made freely available to the general public. This helped
provide an additional layer of transparency to reporting of the
numbers of people infected with influenza and the relative impact
on the wider community. We believe that this contributed to the
overall national risk communication strategy and helped to reduce
the level of panic and disruption to normal activity feared at the
onset of the pandemic.
Several limitations of our work need to be highlighted. Firstly,
this system of data collection was fully dependent on the goodwill
Figure 3. Evaluation of forecasts. (Left) Actual (red and orange crosses) and predicted (grey shaded area) average number of patients presenting
with influenza-like illness per day at the average participating GPFD. The information used to form the forecast is indicated by the red crosses. The
last day of information used in forming the forecast is indicated with a red triangle. Predictions here (and in the right-hand column) take the form of
decreasing credible intervals, with the region spanned by the outermost polygons corresponding to 95% credibility. Orange crosses indicate future
data not used in forming the forecasts. (Right) Predicted total number of people who (i) are currently symptomatic, or (ii) have recovered, assuming
no pre-existing immunity. The last day of information used in forming the forecasts is indicated with a red triangle. The cyan cross on the bottom
panel indicates the age-adjusted estimate of adult seroconversion in the community from an independent study (maximum likelihood estimate and
95% confidence interval, Mark I-Cheng Chen, personal correspondence).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010036.g003
Figure 4. Quantification of predictive error. Posterior absolute
deviation between predicted average ILIs per GPFD and observed
average, with error averaged over the one week period following the
time the forecast is made.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010036.g004
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We found that we could continue to motivate the participating
GPFDs by providing frequent updates based on their aggregated
contributions. Although we sent out mass appeals to over 500 e-
mail addresses, only 23 GPFDs agreed to participate. The poor
response rate could be due to a combination of factors, including:
1. duplicate or invalid e-mail addresses, the former of which could
have been addressed by pre-grepping the list, the latter by
better book-keeping;
2. spam filtering, which can only really be addressed by using
alternatives to e-mail, such as facsimile;
3. lack of publicity on the objectives and importance of our
project, which might have been improved by more careful
rhetoric in the invitation letter we sent;
4. and reluctance by GPFDs to commit to the burden of data
collection during an impending epidemic which was already
anticipated to increase workload.
The final premise may be the most critical, and we suggest that
some form of financial reimbursement be considered to compen-
sate GPFDs for the effort and time needed to drive data
submission in future, as this would likely improve recruitment
rates and make such a system sustainable in the long term.
Overall, the poor response rate highlights the challenge of
recruiting appropriate clinics for any such system, particularly
when using e-mails to disseminate such information, and at short
notice. However, for a medium-sized city of 4.8 million residents,
the network of around 20 GPFDs sufficed to provide considerable
information on epidemic progress. Notwithstanding this small
number of participating GPFDs, the surveillance system achieved
its intended objective of tracking and forecasting influenza
epidemic activity in near real-time. The small number of
participating GPFDs (estimated to be about 2% of all GPFD
clinics in Singapore) may make it difficult to assess if our ILI data
are representative of all influenza diagnoses during the epidemic,
but this is a limitation common to sentinel GPFD networks for
influenza. The potential impact of non-representativeness caused
by non-response would not, however, impact the validity of the
forecasts, since the methods used for that do not assume the
sentinels were selected at random. Other countries have used
GPFD networks for surveillance of other viral illnesses [8–
13,20,21,28] and perhaps the combined lessons from these
strategies could be applied more widely internationally.
In hindsight, several aspects of the approach could have been
bettered. We did not anticipate the strong day of the week effect on
ILI consulting rates, and this had a deleterious effect on predictions,
especially when moving to Mondays from Sundays. In mid-July we
changed the model to allow different rates at the weekend from the
rest of the week, but by mid-August it became clear that the model
would fit much better were every day of the week allowed its own
reporting rate; this is the model presented herein. Again, in
hindsight, it is obvious that there was bound to be sufficient
information in the data to be able to estimate the differential
reporting rates over the days of the week. Alternative models, such
as the Richards model [39,40], might have proven as or more
effective, and certainly could be more parsimonious, than the
compartmental model we used, but our experience was that the
challenges of developing the software before any data had been
collected effectively ruled out deciding on an optimal model to use.
As is common in the field of infectious disease modelling, the model
we used made many simplifying assumptions (see methods), all of
which may potentially have reduced the quality of the forecasts. For
instance, the presence of heterogeneous mixing or susceptibility in
reality but not in the model may lead eventually to changes to the
parameter estimates over time as the routine endeavours to fit a
model excluding these effects, but in forming forecasts at an early
stage, the future path of parameter estimates is unknown and so
forecasts cannot take this into account. In this paper, we have used
the term ‘‘forecast’’ sensu Keyfitz [41], to indicate the belief we
invested in these predictions and the way they were used in
contingency planning in some of the authors’ institutions. This
contrasts with his definition of a projection, which is the
extrapolation of past trends without claiming to expect them to
match the future. A consequence of this reticence, according to
Keyfitz, is that projections cannot be wrong (never being claimed
right), while predictions or forecasts are ‘‘practically certain’’ [41] to
be in error, and are prone to black swan-type events [42]—
accepting this, and excepting the initial predictions, the forecasts we
made fared very well (figures 3 and 4). Had we concentrated instead
on projecting the epidemic, via a suite of competing models, we
might have learned more about the assumptions underlying those
models, which would have informed future modelling efforts. A
comparison of different projecting approaches, as has been done for
seasonal influenza monitoring [43], would therefore be very useful
to refine the general approach for future outbreaks of emerging
diseases, but this remains work for the future.
In conclusion, a real-time GPFD surveillance system can be set
up rapidly during an epidemic and is able to show the progress of
the epidemic. Such an inexpensive system can be deployed even in
resource-poor settings to track future influenza epidemics and
pandemics and forecast their trajectories in near real-time.
Materials and Methods
Ethics approval
Ethics approval for the project was obtained from the
institutional review board of the National University of Singapore.
Recruitment, enrollment and inclusion criteria for GPFDs
We obtained e-mail addresses of GPFDs in Singapore from the
College of Family Physicians Singapore (CFPS) and the directory of
PandemicPreparedness Clinics, a group of over 200 clinics registered
with the Ministry of Health to manage influenza cases. In all,
invitations were sent to 535 e-mail addresses. A series of road shows
was also conducted at the CFPS to describe how ILI surveillance
could help to track an epidemic. GPFDs who agreed to participate
were also asked to extend the recruitment to their contacts.
Participating GPFDs had to be doctors registered with the
Singapore Medical Council who worked at least three full days a
Figure 5. Subjective posterior distributions of parameters and Rt Posterior mean and marginal point-wise 95% credible intervals.
The reader’s posterior distributions may differ from ours (see refs [32–34]). In the background for reference is the number of ILIs per GPFD per day
(not to scale). The line of unity is marked on the panel for the effective reproduction number, Rt; the posterior crosses the line of unity around the
day of the peak. Prior distributions for the parameters (Rt is not a parameter) are indicated on the appropriate panels, using the notation Be for the
beta distribution and Nz m,s2   
for the modified normal distribution such that if X*Nz m,s2   
then Y*N m,s2   
and X~DYD. The prior
distributions taken for the states were E 0 ðÞ *Nz
Z 75,302   
, I 0 ðÞ *Nz
Z 60,302   
and R 0 ðÞ ~0 (a Dirac delta prior), where Nz
Z m,s2   
is similar to
Nz m,s2   
except that its support is the integers, and its mass function at x is obtained by integrating the density for Nz m,s2   
from x{1=2 to
xz1=2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010036.g005
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community. Participation was purely voluntary and participating
GPFDs were given the option to withdraw from the project at any
time.
Data submission and processing
Enrolled GPFDs were requested to submit returns on their work
days by e-mail or facsimile by 2pm the following day. The data
submitted comprised information on clinically diagnosed ARIs.
Clinically, influenza is an acute respiratory infection. As a group,
the ARIs may be defined as a clinical diagnosis of patients who
present with new short-term (time from onset less than two weeks)
respiratory symptoms of cough, rhinorrhœ a, nasal congestion
and/or sore throat, which may or may not be accompanied by
fever. The syndrome is usually though not exclusively associated
with viral æ tiologies. The range of pathogens responsible for ARI
besides influenza is described in a recent WHO paper [44]. A
number of viruses cause a clinical illness which is difficult to
distinguish from influenza, including respiratory syncytial virus,
piconaviruses, parainfluenza, and adenovirus. These produce an
influenza like illness [45]. The operational definition of ILI we
then used in performing the analyses was an ARI exhibiting a
fever of §37.8uC; this approximates the definition used by the
United States’ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which
defines ILI as an acute illness with cough and/or sore throat with a
fever of §37.8uC, in the absence of a known cause other than
influenza [46]. Other data elements collected in the data collection
form (figure S1) included demographic, clinical, and antiviral
treatment information.
Mathematical modelling
Disease dynamics are modeled via a standard, stochastic
compartmental model [47–50, inter alios], with daily increments
and individuals passing through a series of unobserved classes
corresponding to clinical stages of infection—Susceptible, Exposed
(infected but not infectious), Infectious and Removed (recovered
and subsequently immune, or deceased)—formulated by the
equations
St~St{1{At
Et~Et{1zAt{Bt
It~It{1zBt{Ct
Rt~Rt{1zCt
where At, Bt, Ct represent the number of people in the whole
population newly infected, infectious, and removed, respectively.
These are assumed to follow binomial distributions as follows
At*Bin St{1,1{exp { e{bIt{1 ½  =N fg ðÞ
Bt*Bin Et{1,1{exp {1=l fg ðÞ
Ct*Bin It{1,1{exp {1=c fg ðÞ :
To be explicit, the infection model is formulated under the
simplifying assumptions that:
1. infections are allowed to arise from importation at an
assumptive constant rate e and from other local cases using
the law of mass action, with b characterising the mixing and
transmission probabilities of the local population, which as a
first-order approximation is assumed to be homogeneous;
2. ‘‘importations’’ at rate e represent inhabitants of the country
becoming infected via travel abroad or via travellers passing
through Singapore, not of new immigrants entering the
country infected;
3. the population size is taken to be fixed at 4.8M with no birth,
death or genuine immigration or emigration during the
epidemic (we ignored the fact that the official population size
increased to 5M during the epidemic);
4. transition from exposed to infectious to removed is assumed to
occur at constant rates l
{1 and c{1, respectively;
5. per-capita rates (r [ R
z) can be transformed to daily probabil-
ities (p [ (0,1)) using the relationship p~1{exp {r ðÞ ; and
6. no parameters change with time.
As with all models, the assumptions that go into ours can be
criticised on biological, sociological and epidemiological grounds.
Note that neither the parameters h~ b,e,l,c ðÞ nor the states
St~ St,Et,It,Rt fg are known.
The infection model is married to an observation model,
namely that the (known) number of cases reported on day t is
Dt*Pois Ntyt ðÞ where Nt is the (known) number of GPFDs
submitting reports on day t and
yt~dd(t) wzIt=2084 fg
where dt ðÞis the day of the week of day t (Monday being 1 and so
on). The parameters of the observation model are thus di for
i~1,...,7—the probability an infectious individual will seek
medical attention on day of the week i—and w, which is related to
the ‘‘background’’ consulting rate for non-H1N1 ILIs. We took the
differential reporting rates to be the same for H1N1 and non-
H1N1 ILIs, so that wdi represents the typical number of ILIs per
GPFD on day i in the absence of the pandemic. There were 1480
GPFD in Singapore in 2001 [51], and the population grew 17%
from 2001 to 2009, resulting in an estimated 1730 GPFDs in
Singapore in 2009; 83% of patients attend these rather than
polyclinics [51], and together these yield the divisor 2084; this
permits the parameters to have a more natural interpretation
(under the assumption that the participating GPFDs are
representative) but is unneccessary for the analysis, as it functions
as a mere rescaling of dd(t). We artificially take the day of the week
of public holidays to be a Sunday, with the normal week structure
resuming the following day.
The assumptions of the observation model are that:
7. consultations occur only when individuals are infectious;
8. consultations are conditionally independent;
9. per capita consulting probabilities for those infected with
influenza A (H1N1-2009) are constant throughout the
epidemic; and
10. overall consulting rates for other diseases that may be mistaken
for influenza A (H1N1-2009) are also constant —excluding the
day of week effect— i.e. there are no concurrent epidemics (an
assumption subsequently supported by laboratory testing that
suggested limited levels of co-circulating strains).
H1N1 Monitoring in Singapore
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In the original formulation, we forced di~d for all i, i.e. to be
equal. In the middle of July, in response to the obvious variation
over the week, we changed the constraint of the model to
d1~d2~...~d5 and d6~d7. By mid-August, it was apparent
that the day of the week effect needed to differ on each day of the
week to attain a good fit. It is therefore the model without
constraints that we present in this paper.
Statistical methodology
The parameters of the model are estimated within the Bayesian
statistical paradigm [52, for instance] in which semi-informative
prior distributions are assigned to parameters and incoming data
incorporated via the likelihood function to obtain a time series of
posterior distributions for the parameters and unobserved state
space.
Since the state space is unobserved, a statistical method called
particle filtering [53,54] is used to integrate over the possible
realisations consistent with the daily observations. A series of
10 000 ‘‘particles’’ are created to which are associated parameter
values and state space configurations generated from the prior
distribution. Particles are iterated forward one day at a time via
simulation of the state space, and the likelihood function calculated
conditional on the trajectory of that particle and its associated
parameter values. The likelihood function is then used to weight
the particle. Particle degeneracy is overcome via resampling [54],
while particle diversity is maintained via kernel smoothing [55];
the latter means that the resulting posterior distribution is
approximate. The (approximate) posterior predictive distribution
is derived by continuing the simulations beyond the last
observation and weighting the resulting distribution via the
particle weights at the last observation.
The particle filter algorithm proceeds as follows.
1. Initialisation. Set t~0. A set of P particles is drawn from the
prior distribution for initial states S0 and parameters h. This
prior distribution is described below, and is loosely based on
preliminary findings from the literature. Particle p at time t is a
vector x
p
t~ St,h ðÞ with associated weight w
p
t. Initially,
w
p
0~1=P V p.
2. Iteration. For each particle p, Stz1 is drawn using Monte
Carlo simulation from its conditional distribution given x
p
t.
3. Weighting. We then set ~ x x
p
tz1~ Stz1,h ðÞ . The likelihood
contribution L
p
tz1~fD tz1D~ x x
p
tz1
  
is then calculated. The
weights are adjusted by setting ~ w w
p
tz1~w
p
tL
p
tz1 and then scaled
so they sum to one:
^ w w
p
tz1~
~ w w
p
tz1 PP
q~1 ~ w w
q
tz1
:
4. Resampling. Let ^ x x
p
tz1~~ x x
q
tz1 where q is drawn from the
integers 1,2,...,P fg with probability proportional to ^ w w
q
tz1,
then setting w
p
tz1~1=P V p.
5. Kernel smoothing. Let x
p
tz1~m
p
tz1zh ^ x x
p
tz1{m
p
tz1
  
z
Z
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1{h2 p
(with entries rounded to the nearest integer for state
space values) where, following Trenkel et al. [55], we set h~0:3,
Z is generated from a multivariate Gaussian distribution with
mean vector 0 and variance given by the variance-covariance
matrix of ^ x x
p
tz1 over all p, and m
p
tz1 is the vector of means of
^ x x
p
tz1 over all p if the simulated value x
p
tz1 falls within the
correct support or x
p
tz1~^ x x
p
tz1 otherwise.
6. Increment t by one and repeat steps 2 onwards, until the
current time is reached; thereafter to obtain the posterior
predictive distribution repeat step 2 only (incrementing t) for as
long as desired.
The algorithm provides the posterior distribution of any
parameter, state or function thereof (such as the basic reproduc-
tion number, R0, or the effective reproduction number, Rt, see e.g.
[56,57]) by taking a weighted average of this characteristic
according to the posterior weights w
p
t at the last observation time
t. Here, only the posterior predictive distribution of the underlying
states is of interest. Since the prior distributions taken were
subjective (see below), the resulting posterior distributions are also
subjective, and as a caveat lector we caution that our posterior
distributions may differ from the reader’s; for further information
on subjective probability the reader is directed to the writings of de
Finetti (e.g. [34]) or Lindley (e.g. [33]). For references on particle
filtering and examples of its use in population dynamic modelling
in ecology, see [53–55,58–61].
The prior distributions used are given in figure 5. In setting
these, we aimed to balance the need to supplement the
information content of the sentinel data with relevant information
from other sources, with the desire not to obliterate the signal from
the data. We set the prior mean for the infection rate, b, to be 1.2,
with standard deviation 0.8. Combined with the prior distribution
for the infectious period, this leads to a range for R0 of 0 to around
6, i.e. more than spanning the range of estimates for historic
pandemics. The prior distribution for the importation rate, e, was
derived from a crude extrapolation of the timeline of the first five
weeks of importations to the country [62]. The prior distributions
for the latent period and infectious period were modelled loosely
on symptom onset after infection on an aeroplane [63] and a
review of volunteer challenge studies [64]. The prior distributions
for the background rate of non-pandemic ILIs (w) were based upon
the clinical insight of the authors, and for the reporting
probabilities from guesstimation, noting that it is common for
employers or schools in Singapore to require a formal medical
certificate before allowing staff or students off work or out of class.
We conservatively forced R 0 ðÞ to be 0 since we did not know how
the findings of studies in temperate countries [38] relating to prior
exposure would extrapolate to the tropics; in this way, forecasts
may be seen as worst case scenarios. The prior distributions for
E 0 ðÞand I 0 ðÞwere derived from extrapolating the number of
confirmed locally acquired cases.
Predictive error was assessed by taking the posterior distribution
of absolute difference between forecasts and observations,
averaged over a one-week time horizon, and then averaged to
get the posterior mean prediction error.
All statistical routines were written by the authors using the R
statistical programming language [65].
Automation script
Modelling results were updated daily around 3pm to a website
that could be publicly accessed [66]. This was automated using a
bourne shell script that handled time, file transfer, archiving of
previous forecasts, statistical processing, and positing of new
output on the web. This was run on a unix web server using ISC’s
cron.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Data collection form.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010036.s001 (0.01 MB
PDF)
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Note the change in scale on the y-axis.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010036.s002 (0.81 MB
SWF)
Video S2 Animation of forecast total nationwide ILI cases
seeking medical attention. The day of week effect has been
removed for clarity by treating all days as being Mondays. Note
the change in scale on the y-axis.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010036.s003 (0.48 MB
SWF)
Video S3 Animation of forecast proportion of population
infected or recovered, including those not seeking medical
attention. Note the change in scale on the y-axis.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0010036.s004 (0.50 MB
SWF)
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